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1.
In this paper, I want to begin to contemplate the possibility that the concept of culture
could one day be thought outside modern Western thought, via a  reading  of  Martin
Heidegger's 'Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer'. As we shall see,
for Heidegger, the dominant position here is representationalism. And so a large part of
what I want to do here is to begin to shake the concept of culture from these dominant
representationalist moorings.1
Heidegger's problem with the history of Western thought may be put as follows. In this
tradition, the difference between Being and beings (the ontological difference)  is
forgotten so that Being comes primarily to be considered in terms of beings. Beings are, in
turn, considered in terms of their relations to one another, with the being  called  'man'
routinely standing to one privileged side of those known as 'objects'. Thereby  thinking
about Being is reduced to the question: how is it that man relates to objects? The problem
is compounded when the answer to this question is given as: man knows objects. And it is
even further compounded by the dominance throughout all of this of  representational
thinking: the idea that man knows objects only 'indirectly' through their representations.2
To challenge representational thinking in Heidegger's sense, then, is to challenge not just a
'way of knowing' but also the dominance of 'man' (Foucault's central uptake of Heidegger),
the separation between 'man' and 'things', subject and object, and, ultimately, it is  to
challenge the very idea that Being is no more than the aggregate of empirically accessible
beings.
To find alternatives to representational thinking Heidegger looks elsewhere, or, more
precisely, in turning to the pre-Socratic Greeks, elsewhen. He does this throughout his
work, but most explicitly in Early Greek Thinking. Yet even this work barely distinguishes
between (what we would now think of as) natural and cultural production in any clear way.
Instead, it appears there as if the ontological difference itself --  the  difference  between
Being and beings, between sheer coming-to-presence and that which happens to be
present -- is of such urgent importance that it cuts across the apparently less important
distinction between natural and cultural varieties of beings. As an advancement of his
claims about the ontological difference (as a neglected and almost unthinkable difference
today), the Heidegger of Early Greek Thinking in effect obviates  the  nature/culture
distinction along with representational thinking.
If the modern Western concept of culture, then, depends for its existence on the prior
existence of a constitutive outside (such as nature) then is it possible that culture as
such (whatever theory of it we hold) is irrevocably part of representationalist thinking? Is it
intrinsically representationalist -- from, say, Hobbes to the present day or,  indeed,  in
whatever past or future manifestation -- by virtue of its dependence on  a  culture/non-
culture distinction? If this is so, again, there is a remarkable consequence for  all  the
cultural disciplines and for cultural studies in particular. It is this: any  non-
representationalist approach to culture would be a contradiction in terms; so that, by virtue
of it being specifically culture we are interested in, our interest will be necessarily
representationalist. Outside representationalism, what we are dealing with could not be
culture as such. The sorts of objects which we have, until now, thought of as  cultural
objects (photographs, museums, policy documents, forms of dress, music and so  on)
become interesting and significant outside representationalism only to the extent that they
instanciate the ontological difference. We can, that is, no longer afford to think of  the
cultural as ontologically separate in any way. Instead, the move away  from
representational thinking would mean that objects of whatever kind -- 'gods and  men,
temples and cities, sea and land, eagle and snake, tree and shrub, wind and light, stoneM/C Journal
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and sand, day and night' (Early 40) -- are effects of the distinction between coming-to-
presence and merely happening to be present. And they ought to be experienced,
inspected and understood for what they are, fundamentally, in this respect. What would
this mean?
One occasion where the later Heidegger does treat 'cultural' matters (in several senses
and by, perhaps for the first and only time, going across contemporary cultures) is in
his 'Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer'.3 This strangely readable
little colloquy requires inspection, I believe, if we are to proceed any further along what the
Heidegger of Early Greek Thinking calls 'the lines of usage' and into the peculiar territory
beyond representational thinking.4
2.
What is at stake here may be this: whether in this dialogue we are  experiencing  a
cultural difference. Or perhaps, whether we are experiencing the presence of culture(s)
at all. Put another way: the essay in question (in the form of a dialogue) may be  an
instance of either (a) a cultural difference or dialogue; or else of (b)  an  accidental
similarity or monologue. Let us look briefly at both possibilities.
If (a), then we have a clear lesson (on the model of the 'danger' of language): the
nature of culture cannot derive from a metaphysical distinction  between  culture  and
contenders for the title of 'non-culture' (for example, physical nature or science  or
barbarism); for anything that was a culture would have to be already in place in order to
generate such a division (or anything like it) in the first place. The name, then, of this prior
condition cannot be 'culture' itself. But that is precisely how the cultural disciplines have
used the term -- 'cultures', we hear, are what make the 'nature/culture' distinction -- albeit
that each may do it in its own, 'culturally specific', way.5 This is why the cultural disciplines
cannot imagine a culture which does not, in itself, have a deeply-seated representational
concept of culture as its ultimate ground. Anthropological thinking -- in the broadest
philosophical sense, not just in reference to a specific discipline -- entails the search for the
other's meaning of its own (anthropology's) idea of culture. In effect, it cannot imagine a
culture outside Western metaphysics but must forever translate 'different cultures' into
versions of it (albeit with minor empirical differences). So if the name of the condition for
the nature/culture distinction (that is, the name of the nature of culture)  cannot  be
'culture', instead its name must be 'representational thinking' -- at least for  all  cultural
theory to date. The modern concept of culture's ultimate contradiction would  be  that  it
would rest upon the assumption of its own universal presence while also denying cultural
universals.
If (b) -- if, that is, we are not, in this dialogue, undergoing an experience with culture
at all -- then the 'Japanese' is no more than a token non-European Heideggerian. He is
whatever may be non-European 'in' Heidegger himself. He is a fictional device for having
Heidegger's fellow Europeans (his readers) see how it is possible to think outside Western
thinking -- or at least to get a glimpse of such a possibility. He is a stooge, a ploy, and --
what's more -- an 'orientalised' ploy: a classically European fictional depiction of  the
mysterious Orient and its inscrutable thinking.
So much is at stake in how we read this work. And a number of very important issues
depend on our (necessarily ethical and political) decision as to how we should read the
essay. For if reading (a) prevails, cultural difference (or whatever term we decide to use to
replace it and its ultimately limited horizon) is not something, in itself, of  its  nature  or
essence, that can give any comfort to notions of 'orientalism' or 'stereotypes' or any of the
other tropes of fashionable (cross-)cultural criticism. Instead, the cultural itself, wherever
it is predicated on Western representational thinking, is intrinsically Western  thinking.
There is no outside of Western culture (the Western concept of culture) for that culture to
grasp -- whether it would ideally grasp it in scientific,  anthropological,  liberal  humanist,
cultural relativist, orientalist, colonialist or racist ways. These 'ways' and  the  differences
between them have no meaning on reading (a). They are all, in effect, one way.
But if reading (b) prevails, then all seems well with Western representational thinking.
It has no problem because, now, all cultures would, factually, have a Western concept
of culture at their core, albeit of a particular inflexion. They would all be just like 'us' in
their essential metaphysics. He who recorded the different tensions or versions of this
single metaphysics might be a scientist or anthropologist. He who appreciated such small
variations might be a liberal humanist or a cultural relativist. He who dogmatically believed
in the superiority of his own tension or difference and degraded others might be  an
orientalist, a colonialist or a racist. But these would be, on reading (b), but small variations
along a single path. They would be like the right, left and centre lanes of a one-way street.M/C Journal
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So neither reading turns out to be very hopeful for today's cultural disciplines. The
first suggests a much deeper-seated difference than those disciplines have been able
to imagine hitherto; something much less easily grasped than the  culture/non-culture
distinction (and such that some 'cultures' are not, in and of themselves, quite that). The
second suggests that the easy victories of principled cultural criticism and cultural identity
politics (as well as those of less 'enlightened' positions) are grounded on the most Western
of Western thinking: its representationalist theology.6
It looks as if there are only two possibilities: either culture rests upon a  bed  of
difference that lies so deep as to remain forever outside Western thinking; or every
other is ultimately, at the deepest point of difference we can think, a version of the West.
But on both sides of the divide, the initial idea of culture is culture-as-presence: 'are we in
the presence of an intercultural dialogue?'; or 'are we in the presence of a culture talking
to itself?' If we could move even a little way from this and begin to think of culture-as-
coming-to-presence (or just as 'to come', to invoke a Derridean variation on the theme),
then it turns out that (a) and (b) are necessarily undecidable matters within
representational thinking itself but that, as we begin to move outside  it,the  decision
becomes irrelevant. But we must reserve this (in)decision for another occasion and proceed
with the dialogue at hand.
3.
To proceed, we must continue with the dialogue's attention to language and
particularly to the 'danger' of speaking about it. Language, that is, has a nature but it
is concealed (by the representationalist difference between the sensuous and  the
suprasensuous) and this concealing is a 'danger' (21). One contender for  the  nature  of
language is to take it as 'the house of Being' (22). And this prompts us to remember that
the dialogue describes the two cultures as different 'houses' (5) --  different  'language
realities' (24) -- so that 'the nature of language remains something altogether different for
the East asian and the European peoples' (23). In fact, it is so different that the question
of what language is may not be a possible one for the Japanese (23). He insists that his
people 'pay no heed' to the question of the nature of language. Instead they have a word
that 'says the essential being of language, rather than being of use as a name for speaking
and for language' (23). So this is not a referring word but rather a 'hinting' word (24). And
the 'hint' would be what the Japanese translator feels when he feels the 'wellspring' from
which such different languages as German and Japanese might arise. He also describes this
in terms of a 'radiance'. This 'hinting', or 'gesturing', or 'bearing' (26) must  not,  the
Inquirer demands, be clarified into a form of 'conceptual representation' (25). Were it to
be, we would miss its nature outside Western reason. There is no analytic  or  empirical
equivalent of 'the nature of language'. To think so is itself an instance of the worst sorts of
metaphysics at work.
Following through the dialogue, we also find that to ask about the nature of language
is also to ask the hermeneutic question in its non-standard sense;that is  not  as  a
methodological question about the means of interpreting texts but as a metaphysical
question about what interpretation itself is (29-30). And this in turn has to do  with
'bearing' (as in bearing a message, being a messenger -- gesturing, bearing, hinting). The
so-far unannounced Japanese word for the nature of language, on the one hand, and the
question of what hermeneutics is, on the other, stand together. 'Man stands  in
hermeneutical relation to the two-fold' (32), where 'the two-fold' is glossed as presencing
(coming-to-presence) and present beings.
This hermeneutic relation, however, is complex. It involves man in preserving the two-
fold (32) and also in the two-fold (presencing/present) using man (33).  And,
obviously enough perhaps, this idea of 'use' can no longer mean empirical usage  in  its
quasi-linguistic sense. For, as we soon learn from the rest of the essays in On the Way to
Language, the linguistic arts and sciences are thoroughly representationalist since they
begin with the assumption of the simple existence of present beings (forgetting coming-to-
presence and language's criticality to it) and consider language, as it were, to come later
as a means of, and for, their re-presentation. (And this is, I  would  argue,  precisely  the
function of terms such as 'language', 'discourse', 'signification' and 'image' in, for example,
cultural studies.) Nevertheless the alternative to this mistaken view of language, the
alternative that Heidegger calls 'the hermeneutic relation', is agentive. In fact it is doubly
so. It involves, that is, practices (of preserving and using): 'the sway of usage' (33) and
'the sway of the two-fold' (34). The Japanese claims that there is a kinship between this
thinking and his (or their) own (41).
This hermeneutic relation, however, is complex. It involves man in preserving the two-
fold (32) and also in the two-fold (presencing/present) using man (33).  And,
obviously enough perhaps, this idea of 'use' can no longer mean empirical usage  in  itsM/C Journal
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Language, the linguistic arts and sciences are thoroughly representationalist since they
begin with the assumption of the simple existence of present beings (forgetting coming-to-
presence and language's criticality to it) and consider language, as it were, to come later
as a means of, and for, their re-presentation. (And this is, I  would  argue,  precisely  the
function of terms such as 'language', 'discourse', 'signification' and 'image' in, for example,
cultural studies.) Nevertheless the alternative to this mistaken view of language, the
alternative that Heidegger calls 'the hermeneutic relation', is agentive. In fact it is doubly
so. It involves, that is, practices (of preserving and using): 'the sway of usage' (33) and
'the sway of the two-fold' (34). The Japanese claims that there is a kinship between this
thinking and his (or their) own (41).
Footnotes
1.  Representational thinking is clearly alive and well today in cultural studies -- perhaps
even to the point whereby this otherwise critical discipline rarely subjects this
concept to critical scrutiny. See Hall (Representation). A draft paper 'Representation
and Cultural Studies' (available on request) deals with this question.
2.  Hall's Representation book lists three such forms of indirect representation: 'the
production of meaning through language, discourse and image'.
3.  Two other central locations for Heidegger on culture are 'The Age of the Word
Picture' and 'Science and Reflection'. Here and elsewhere, of course, Heidegger has
very little time for the idea of culture and 'culturalist' explanations -- possibly
because of their traditionally deep imbrication in representationalism. At times, his
opposition is so vehement that we can practically hear him reaching for his gun.
4.  In Early Greek Thinking, Heidegger translates a crucial part of the Anaximander
fragment as follows: '... along the lines of usage [custom, practice]: for they let
order and thereby also reck belong to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder'
(Early 57).
5.  A paper submitted for this issue of M/C nicely displays this in a single phrase: 'the
Western cultural pattern that assigns things masculine to the cultural and things
feminine to the natural' (my emphases).
6.  On this matter, see Hunter on 'Setting Limits'.
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